

**CHOICE, CON(SEQUENCE), AND PARADOX IN DOSTOEVSKY'S *CRIME AND PUNISHMENT* AND *THE BROTHERS KARAMOZOV***

---

Author:

William Westerman

Faculty Sponsor:

Harriet Hustis,

*Department of English*

---

**ABSTRACT AND INTRODUCTION**

---

The sequence of time is a many-faceted thing. Often distant and hazy, or clear and articulated, the structure of a written work significantly contributes to its impact and scope. In a novel, structured sequence can provide a type of stable explanation; life is an ordered series of causes and effects, of rights and wrongs, and affirmations and denials. In its way, the overarching structure contributes to the internal logic of a text. However, when the bonds of linear sequence are broken, a transformation of both form and function occurs.

In the works of Fyodor Dostoevsky, such a transformation is at the cornerstone of narrative intelligence, and works in conjunction with the ideas presented by different characters in order to work toward a large, mythic scope. This sense of reality becomes evident through the comparison and analysis of many stories crafted by Dostoevsky. In *Crime and Punishment*, Rodya Raskolnikov, an impoverished former student and fledgling rationalist revolutionary chooses to uphold the possibility of an ideal rather than the ideal itself, resulting in two very different murders, with two very different motives. This intellectual crisis, of rationality and the importance of one's personal ideals, leads not to one true resolution, but to a resolve to consider the multiple truths inherent in Raskolnikov's crimes, and the acceptance of consequence. Similarly, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, Dostoevsky once again chooses to create a character intent on the pursuit of a higher ideal, only to have that certainty dashed in times of struggle – specifically, the death of Fyodor Karamazov. Ivan Fyodorovich, Fyodor's intelligent but confused son, chooses to measure the world on rational grounds, in defiance of the Christian-based reasoning of 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia. Following the divergent paths of both Rodya and Ivan, however, illuminates a struggle between each character's conception of intentionality and consequence, in turn creating a tension between chronological and non-linear time. This analysis of narrative structure in conjunction with the development of a protagonist recalls the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who argues that "the image of man is always intrinsically chronotopic" ("Chronotope," Bakhtin 85). The measure of a protagonist can thus be analyzed within this context.

Against the uncertainty of the universe, both men, irrespective of their various situations, give way to the intoxication of an idea, and add support for an analysis of the paradoxical nature of choice and consequence. As such, the ambiguity of causality and chronological structure within both novels drives Rodya and Ivan's search for meaning, and also works against the conception of linear, sequential time. Working against a past, present, and future, Rodya and Ivan's loss of an ideal, and subsequent affirmation of uncertainty allows the bonds of causality and sequence to be redefined for a richer representation of a flexible time.

---

*Crime and Punishment* begins with Rodya's rehearsal of his impending murder of Alena Ivanovna, the miserly pawnbroker, in order to maintain his guise of a superior rational man. His feverish devotion illuminates his initial certainty in his idea, that "men are most afraid of...a new word – that is what they fear most of all...but I am talking too much. That's why I don't act, because I am always talking. Or perhaps I talk so much because I can't act...can I really be capable of that?" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 2). The manner of Rodya's speech, besides the breathless intonation of a quasi-vagabond, contains the

paradoxical ideas of many in Dostoevsky's worlds. Rodya's validation of his rational ideology delineates his conception of a transcendent order to his thinking, of a tightly controlled set of causes and effects. As such, in the abstraction of rationality, Rodya Raskolnikov's growing *übermensch* theory leads to the overdevelopment of internal thoughts, creating a schism between his own internal world, timeless, and his concrete external surroundings. As such, Rodya's fascination at his role as a superior man consumes his every waking moment, evident in his dismal spiral towards material lack and physical decay. With this initial hunger and irritability comes Rodya's development of the novel's, and Dostoevsky's, fascination with ideas. The exposition of the novel provides insight into the workings of Rodya's mind, establishing his sense of intellectual polarity, and the idea that rational actions must have foreseeable consequences.

In this way, Dostoevsky breaks the bounds of a novel's traditional sequence through Rodya's erratic rationalism and belief in fate, and subsequent loss of certainty in consequence. This becomes an irregular thread that reappears throughout the novel, often affirmed and denied, depending on the mood of Raskolnikov. At the novel's inception, Rodya ponders the feasibility of his ideas and intentions towards his proposed murder. Reflecting on the past, Rodya "did not believe in the reality of his imaginings, and their audacity, which both repelled and fascinated him at the same time...a month later, he saw them in a different light, and had somehow grown used to regarding the 'ugly' dream as a real project, although he still did not trust himself to carry it out, and reproached himself for his own weakness and lack of resolution" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 3). In depicting Raskolnikov as simultaneously enticed and repulsed by the idea of murder, Dostoevsky complicates the simplicity of a single opinion by fully representing the dialogue of an idea in a single entity. Rather than clear development of thought, from choice towards consequence, Rodya's thoughts and representation of his initial idea transform significantly throughout the novel, owing to Dostoevsky's rejection of a linear concept of sequential time.

Thus, Rodya holds that ideas and actions are intrinsically connected, contributing to a linear measure of time sequence. Without an idea, Rodya reasons, an action is not possible, which is yet conflicted by his physical inaction. This contradictory idea, expressed many times over the course of the novel, speaks not to the idiosyncrasies of a character, but of the embodiment of an idea, and the "freedom and power" that come with it (279). Representative of Bakhtin's studies on the nature of dialogic ideas in philosophy and literature, Rodya's angst speaks to the difficulty of containing a fully-formed idea without the influence and exchange of ideas from outside the speaker. Bakhtin defends this point, that "in Dostoevsky's dialogues, collision and quarreling occur not between two integral monologic voices, but between two divided voices (one of those voices, at least, is divided)" (*Poetics*, Bakhtin 256). The quality of dialogue as described by Bakhtin serves as the ideological backbone of Dostoevsky's worlds; Rodya's ideas are an expression of his convoluted conversation with his external surroundings, but within his singular person. Indeed, Bakhtin supports that externality is "the connection between an individual's fate and his world" ("Chronotope," Bakhtin 119).

By measuring Rodya's madness in a dialogic context, it is possible to examine the schism of two voices of conventional thought, and Rodya's radicalism. Following this point, Rodya's rationalism is contested by his friend Razumikhin, who counters that "you cannot divert the course of nature by logic alone...[logic] is temptingly clear-cut, and there is no need think!" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 217). By providing multiple characters as expressions of various aspects of an idea, Dostoevsky is able to supplant the importance of plot progression for the non-linear progression of an idea. By expressing his protagonist as an erratic point for discourse on moral rationalism, Dostoevsky subverts the traditional affirmation of a character's worth, instead seeking to tear away Rodya's inner thought.

In addition, this conflict of self also speaks to Bakhtin's conception of an artistic representation of an idea, which is only possible when posed beyond terms of affirmation and repudiation (*Problems*, Bakhtin). Rodya's erratic polarity is confirmed after his first "test run" of his crime, when he anxiously enters a local pub. He is immediately fortified after he "ordered his beer, and drank the first glass thirstily...he began to feel better at once, and his thoughts grew clearer. 'This is all nonsense,' he said to himself hopefully" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 7). Rodya's hopeful resolution to forget his plan furthers this cycle of affirmation and denial, as interspersed by fitful sleep, small meals, and aimless walks. Therefore, his subsequent commitment to carry out the plan presents the consequence of ideas, of the inaction created by being caught between two decisions.

By working within his own mind, Rodya seeks to abstractly reason and measure to keep his conception of the world, and indirectly time, on a linear model of progressional sequence. Indeed, while hoping to take an axe to accomplish his deed, Rodya finds the office empty, and remarks, "'it was not my planning, but the devil, that accomplished that!' he thought, and laughed strangely, extraordinary heartened by this stroke of luck" (62). The luck ascribed to this event challenges the multiplicity of consequences presented in Dostoevsky's universe, allowing Rodya to mistakenly affirm that he is chosen to carry out his mission in this seemingly perfect situation. Thus, Dostoevsky's contrasted use of non-rational sequence allows Rodya to flounder for a direct sense of causality, in a vain attempt to hold onto his convoluted idea of superior intellect.

By preventing the completion of Rodya's plans and the affirmation of causality, Dostoevsky allows space for contemplation on the nature of internal ideas affecting external reality, and the transformation of self. According to Bakhtin's definition of the adventure novel of everyday life, *Crime and Punishment* should depict only "the exceptional, utterly unusual moments of a man's life..." the moments that "shape the definitive image of the man, his essence, as well as the nature of his entire subsequent life" (*Chronotope*, Bakhtin 116). This clear sense of path and image, however, is dashed when the response to his attempts at action are unintended consequences. This unintended consequence, principally in the un-meditated death of Lizaveta, Alena's meek and defenseless sister, is the novel's initial trigger of the irregular reversal of fortune and logic: how can rational morality exist if its effect is to harm those without fault? For Rodya, this first wave of panic and disillusionment, physically manifested as his illness, displays an initial attempt to fit this new iteration into the complexity of his original plans. Thus, Rodya tries desperately to cover up his crime, while also unraveling mentally, craving to confess.

With this new intersection of external consequence, Rodya's sense of intentionality takes on a bitter edge, of whether his sense of rationalism supersedes the rights and privileges of others. According to Leo Tolstoy, Rodya's "decisions were not made when he stood in front of the other woman [Lizaveta] with an axe in his hand, but rather when he was not yet acting but only thinking, when only his consciousness was active, when barely perceptible changes were taking place in that consciousness" (Tolstoy, qtd. in *Crime* 488). In the struggle between intent and consequence, therefore, internal thought begins the process of action. Through Rodya's ideological thought, internal ideas become external ones, and may yield unforeseen consequences. Unlike Bakhtin's conception of the adventure novel of everyday life, Rodya's ideological trajectory, even when he confesses, lacks the stable and fixed definition it is ascribed. While the path taken by Rodya is "utterly unusual," it denies the linear model of growth taken by most literary heroes, and instead focuses on the power of intention to affect non-causal changes.

Perhaps then, Rodya's path is more clearly represented through a paradoxical model. According to Gary Saul Morson, the consequence of action is that "we strive for things that if we had, we wouldn't want, and would destroy" (*Paradoxical*, Morson 476). This idea of a paradox stands in stark contrast to the rigidity of Rodya's initial thoughts. However, it is clear that his misgivings about acting on his ideas contribute to the possibility of multiple choices to his plans and life. Indeed, during Rodya's final encounter with Svidrigailov, he "could hardly have defined exactly what he wanted at that moment, or just what it was of which he wished to satisfy himself personally" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 409).

Thus, Rodya's unintended consequence and new path dictates a break from the internal authority of his rationalism, and weaves elements of paradox, taking the tight structure of Rodya's plan and breaking it into multiple divergent paths. Rodya could possibly confess to his crime and serve his sentence, but he could also use this break as an excuse to reject rational thinking and work towards the pleasure of personal nihilism. This, it stands to reason, begins to contort the perceived logic of Rodya's life, for "life to be meaningful there must be more than one possible future; only then can our efforts make a difference" (*Paradoxical*, Morson 475). Rather than confirm Rodya's influence on his future, the shift of personal choice towards unintended consequence instead speaks to the irrationality of life, and its necessity in order to gain purpose. In the reversal of expectations, Dostoevsky chooses to decenter the power of human intellect, and instead value the unexplained paradox of choice and fate.

The multiplicity of choice is further emphasized by the insertion of Rodya into other narrative plots and situations in the novel, allowing his rationalist perspective to be challenged by scenarios requiring spontaneity, thus creating deviance in Rodya's idea-based persona. The path of Rodya, already broken, now includes the weaving stories of friends, family, and acquaintances, which begin to reveal Rodya's buried impulses and feelings. Upon encountering the wretched Marmeladovs, penniless and disgraced, Rodya spontaneously gives money given from his mother to the family, as an anonymous act of kindness. Rodya posits that "if I am wrong...if men are not really scoundrels, men in general, the whole human race, I mean – then all the rest is just prejudice, imaginary fears, and there are no real barriers, and that is as it should be!" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 22-3). While this action yields possible interpretation as an expression of Rodya's patronizing attitude, it more clearly realizes the spontaneity of an un-meditated act of kindness. The assumptions that Rodya accepts regarding humanity are challenged in his many encounters with external problems and others who carry contrasting stories and ideas. His experiences in the external world, therefore, serve to manipulate his established set of internal ideas, and serve as a paradoxical counterbalance.

Dostoevsky's use of spontaneity within the text also serves to introduce Christian morality as a counterbalance to mechanical rationalism. This idea of spontaneous choice through unprovoked kindness is further extended when Rodya encounters a drunk and abused girl on the street, and immediately takes a vested interest in her well being. Without the grandiose intentions of his idea to benefit humanity through the murder of Alena, this scene serves to warm the frost covering Rodya's authentic sense of self. These actions, however, seem also to awaken an "impulse to rebirth" that "is retarded by his obdurate commitment to his 'idea'" (*Rudicina* 1067). In this way, Rodya quickly recovers the coolness of his ideological conviction when he posits, "have I any right to help? Let them eat one another alive – what is it to me?" (*Crime*, Dostoevsky 43). The conflict of mechanical thought and compassionate emotion is strong enough to move throughout the current of the novel, as manifestations of reason, chronological time, and mythic, Christian morality. The influx of Christian sentiment comes almost immediately after Rodya's crime, displayed in Rodya's description that "he could almost have knelt down and prayed, but he laughed at his own impulse; he must put his trust in himself, not in prayer" (79). A remedy to the internal structure of Rodya's logic, Christian compassion provides an eternal perspective through which the novel chooses to communicate, in turn removing the linear constraints of secular thought and choice.

Utilizing similar ideas, the path of Ivan Karamazov in *The Brothers Karamazov* can be explored against the paradox of choice and consequence. A character of great doubt in faith, Ivan's trajectory through the course of novel figures into Dostoevsky's larger device of a person searching for self-definition through an ideal, only to have that ideal crushed. In the enlightened uncertainty of the paradox, Dostoevsky seeks to conflictly represent those things that make life so rich and mysterious. Like Rodya's initial rejection of religion, Ivan takes up the position of atheism in order to decentralize power from the traditional Christ-centered structure of 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian society.

Ivan's initial purpose within the novel seems to counterbalance the spiritual optimism espoused by his brother, Alyosha, in order to provide weight to the worldly suffering encountered within the Karamazov's community. While Ivan is portrayed as the smartest of the three brothers, this characteristic is intentionally set up to be twisted and deconstructed later in the novel. In particular, Father Zosima's deep bow towards the disruptive and "sensual" Dmitri Karamazov heavily implicates the great trials expected to follow for each of the brothers. Ironically, the certainty that comes with Ivan's rational sense of human intelligence also contains the anxiety of someone who "seems to hate God for not existing" ("*Paradoxical*," Morson 473). As such, Ivan's condemnation of Alyosha's pious faith in God and the clergy presents Ivan at his most vulnerable and indefensible, someone attempting to make sense of world in which such needless violence against the innocent is perpetrated.

Ivan's uncertainty in his idea is first stirred by his brother, Alyosha. While Ivan continually questions the resolve maintained by Alyosha in his faith, despite rational arguments against a benevolent God, Alyosha's uncertainty on the motives of a higher power, as well as his acceptance of the vague knowledge of human existence somehow proves more stable than the fixed logic of Ivan. Still, Ivan's

sense of torn logic is introduced in order to dramatically juxtapose his linear sense of time and causality with the collective moral responsibility that Alyosha and Father Zosima practice. Indeed, this divide can be seen clearly during Ivan's Grand Inquisitor parable, and Alyosha's dual affirmation and denial of it. While Ivan maintains that since God does not exist, "everything is permitted," the actions of the Grand Inquisitor, specifically, by taking away the freedom of common people for the happiness and stability of all, paradoxically limits the mobility and choice of most people. This sense of rational morality is strikingly similar to Rodya's initial theory, and works in a similar way, for it "will save them from the great anxiety and terrible agony they endure at present in making a free decision for themselves" (*Brothers*, Dostoevsky 225). Through Alyosha's unprovoked goodness in the form of a kiss, Dostoevsky seeks to overturn the stable "freedom" of Ivan through the unconditional love of Alyosha. Through the application of love to a situation with no true answer, Dostoevsky creates a parallel between the irrationality of life and the necessity of love. By inverting the certainty of rationalism with the inexplicable nature of faith, Dostoevsky highlights the concrete and timeless nature of Christianity, while enabling Ivan to further meditate on conflict between choice and consequence.

This facetiousness is further explored when Ivan, called a "clever man," pontificates on his religious views, which, ironically is "at those moments when he is most confused and far from being sure of his actions" (Kanevskaya 369). The paradoxical nature of Ivan's beliefs are introduced in a conversation with Alyosha, where Ivan laments that "I know that I am only going to a graveyard, but it's a most precious graveyard...precious are the dead that lie there, every stone over them speaks of such burning life in the past, of such passionate faith in their work, their truth, their struggle and their science, that I know I shall fall on the ground and kiss those stones and weep over them; though I'm convinced in my heart that it's long been nothing but a graveyard" (*Brothers*, Dostoevsky 199). The fervidness with which Ivan speaks concerns the blessing of mortality within the rhetoric of spiritual rhapsody; Ivan speaks both of secular and sacred worlds. By expressing his tangled inner emotions to Alyosha, Ivan is both seeking to validate his sense of intellectual self, while also hoping for a resolution provided by his brother. Ivan's speech, therefore, presents a classic case of Bakhtin's idea-based hero, whose pursuit of an ideal is challenged based on his external settings.

The notion of choice and non-linear sequencing is further explored through Dostoevsky's multiplicity of time, allowing different plausible events to overlap in periods of time. In the narrative of *The Brothers Karamazov*, this is accomplished in the structuring of Fyodor Karamazov's death, and its intentionally murky circumstances. This is established through what Morson calls "open time," or the idea that many different things could have happened at any particular time, to establish that characters lead more lives than one (*Paradoxical*, Morson 481). This divide between physical life and the expectations of other possible actions drives the plot of *Brothers*, and presents a space on which the characters can each identify with what they exist as, and what they can possibly to exist as. Dmitri is demonstrative of this point, as when he is described looking at his father, previous to his murder, his "personal repulsion was growing unendurable," which is followed by an ellipsis of action (*Brothers*, Dostoevsky 336). The implication of Dmitri's guilt is further heightened by his need for three thousand rubles, which Fyodor declares he has conveniently saved. While Dmitri is heavily implied to have committed the murder, the ellipsis between Dmitri's motivation and the crime itself presents the ambiguity of whether the extreme inclination of a person towards an act constitutes causation. Dmitri later remarks that he's "not guilty of [his] father's blood...[he] meant to kill him. But [he's] not guilty" (388). Implicit in this set of events is that intent and feeling foreshadow agency, thus upholding a specific concept of time as a singular, rational measure of events. However, the ambiguity of this situation is used later to confront Ivan's assumptions about his father's murder, and his sense of universal order.

While the reader is able to believe the set of circumstances presented by Dostoevsky, this is intentionally juxtaposed to Ivan's conversations with Smerdyakov, Fyodor's servant and possible illegitimate son, in order to distort the expectations of traditional story plotting. Since the reveal of the Fyodor's killer, Smerdyakov, is after this misleading series of events, like Ivan, the reader can experience a profound sense of doubt in the honesty of the narrative, and more broadly, the linear model of life. Like Raskolnikov in *Crime and Punishment*, Smerdyakov's elaborations on the theoretical scenarios that can

result in the death of Fyodor further accentuate the murky morality of previous linear events. These unactualized possibilities, while not manifested physically, perhaps also affect future generations of events, implicating the internal will of Ivan as conditional to Smerdyakov's murder of Fyodor (Paradoxical, Morson 482). In Smerdyakov's confrontation of Ivan about his guilt in his father's murder, the implications of shared guilt contributes to Dostoevsky's use of non-chronological time; ultimately, the causality of events gives way to chance, and can be traced back to the action and inaction of all participants of a community. In this way, the tightness of logical conclusions gives way to the possibility of possibility.

Ivan's changing sense of time and causality is further influenced by his interactions with Smerdyakov, in regard to the topic of agency. Ivan's need to intellectually assert himself comes from an unconscious desire to retain a sense of personal agency, which is very much in contrast to the divine will of Christian ideology. From a theological perspective, Michael Stoeber asserts that "this involves a double movement or process, as the will expands outwards in terms of power and contracts inward to the potential freedom of ungrounded desire" (Stoeber 30). While Ivan searches to maintain his freedom in the face of a supposed tyrannical God, the relationship of God and his power over man is mirrored in his relationship with Smerdyakov. During their first conversation after Ivan's return from Moscow, Smerdyakov reinforces, "why should I play with you, sir, when I put my whole trust in you, as in God Almighty?" (*Brothers*, Dostoevsky 511). This puts Ivan into an unwanted position of power, as he struggles to deny his influence on Smerdyakov's ideology, and its rationality for the murder of Fyodor. Smerdyakov finally insists that "You murdered him; you are the real murderer, I was only your instrument, your faithful servant Licharda, and it was following your words I did it" (524). Twisting the ideological base of Ivan's existence, this unwillingness to accept passivity, while also realizing the flaws of complete agency, Dostoevsky rejects the authority of human rationalism, and its association with unmonitored will.

Additionally, Ivan's experiences with the Devil prove his innate distaste for the rationalism that he externally espouses. In conversation with Ivan, the Devil astutely points out that "here, with you, everything is circumscribed, here all is formulated and geometrical, while we have nothing but indeterminate equations!" (536). In contrast to Ivan's use of "The Grand Inquisitor" and the blissful ignorance of lacking free-will, Ivan's Devil raises the futility of seeking control. In this way, the Devil explains that he is necessary because of his obstacles and events – without events, what is life?

The conflict between choice, time, and agency become imperative for Ivan, who clearly is caught between the feelings of his heart, the calculation of his mind, and his relative guilt in the tangled affair of his father's death. This works in conjunction with Morson's idea of choice, which is "*momentous*. It involves *presentness*. The same act performed later would not be quite the same act" (*Narrative and Freedom*, Morson 22). Between Smerdyakov and the Devil, Ivan is confronted externally and internally to acknowledge his connection with those around him, and his sense of responsibility in communal action. Rather than the intellectual order Ivan has created for himself, the manifestation of his ideology in the external world creates this move towards paradoxical uncertainty. In contrast to Ivan's previous rejection of good and evil, the Devil himself espouses the necessary dichotomy of opposing forces. However, rather than give Ivan an easy choice of acceptance or rejection, of being purely rational or spiritual, he ultimately succumbs to the ambiguity of his situation. Like Rodya, Ivan chooses to accept the possibility of agency in a situation, of choice, rather than to firmly choose one position. Thus, Dostoevsky's use of Ivan's indecision and reversal of expectations speaks to the power of non-linear time, rationality, and choice in the world.

Finally, Rodya and Ivan, together, show the consequences of internal rationalism being a detriment to outer society, stemming from the role of non-sequential time that Dostoevsky employs in both narratives. Rather than the isolation of singularity, both characters exist in a tangled network of friends, foes, and experiences that work to upend the certainty of their ideological convictions. While the conclusion of both works detail the changes that Rodya and Ivan undergo, this change is reinforced not as traditional character growth, but of the change an idea undergoes when released externally in the

world. Each character's respective dialogue with their idea, along with the influx of Christian sentiment creates an environment not of plot progression, but of the non-linearity of thought. Only when each character is denied the simplicity of direct causality in their actions does the true, erratic pattern of life emerge.

If the fate of both Rodya and Ivan seems contrived, it is surely because true dialogue presents little actual narrative resolution. Thus, both *Crime and Punishment* and *The Brothers Karamazov*, in their own ways, seek to mirror the human experience of life, despite its unfinalizable ending. Dostoevsky's result, therefore, seeks to limit the importance of chronological time sequence, instead seeking to honor and mourn the ever-present madness of ideas and actions. Like the ripples of a pond, ideas cannot be constrained to one event, one action, but to the overwhelming possibility of each thought in each life. The space of possibility surely then represents a more complete image.

#### WORKS CITED

---

Bakhtin, Mikhail. "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel." *The Dialogic Imagination*. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, (1981): 84-258. Print.

---. *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Ed. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, (1984): 47-266. Print.

Dostoevsky, Feodor. *Crime and Punishment*. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989. Print.

---, et al. *The Brothers Karamazov: A Revised Translation, Contexts, Criticism*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2011. Print.

Kanevskaya, Marina. "Smerdiakov and Ivan: Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*." *Russian Review* 61.3 (2002): 358-376. Web. 15 April 2013.

Morson, Gary Saul. *Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1994. Print.

---. "Paradoxical Dostoevsky." *The Slavic and East European Journal* 43.3 (1999): 471-494. Web. 13 April 2013.

Rudicina, Alexandra F. "Crime and Myth: The Archetypal Pattern of Rebirth in Three Novels of Dostoevsky." *MLA* 87.5 (1972): 1065-1074. Web. 23 April 2013.

Stoeber, Michael. "Dostoevsky's Devil: The Will to Power." *The Journal of Religion* 74.1 (1994): 26-44. Web. 1 May 2013.